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ABSTRACT
Normative solutions for the successful recovery from large-scale disasters have been presented by various
research, but implementation requires a long process, and a mechanism for the process to continue is necessary.
We consider the consistency among strategies of stakeholders such as government and NGOs. These players
make decisions based on not only direct motives but various complex motives and interaction with other players.
This paper considers interactive decision making as a game among stakeholders. As a case study, we analyze
housing reconstruction project in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. There was relatively abundant
financial support, but the recovery process did not work in a desirable direction. Regarding two important decisions
defining the result of recovery, stakeholders’ possible decisions are evaluated and, by using game theoretic
approach, the reason of poor output and the conditions to shift the equilibrium to the one suitable for the long-term
goal of recovery are discussed. These analyses showed that motive compatibility among stakeholders should be
considered when designing a recovery process for severe disasters.
1. INTRODUCTION
Various recovery players including the government,
affected people, NGOs, etc., share the common
objective in recovery, but at the same time, they have
a respective objective and motive (Bosher, 2011;
Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009; Werker, 2010). Each
player’s decision is dependent on not only their
complex motives but also other players’ decisions
(Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2009). Therefore, the
recovery process can be understood as the result of
interaction among players who choose the best
strategy to achieve their objectives. Because longterm recovery outcomes are accumulated results of
several phases in which various players’ decisions
are involved, it is needed for achieving intended
recovery goals to understand players’ complex
motives and interaction among players (Amaratunga
& Haigh, 2011). While past research has addressed
several dimensions of sustainable recovery, the
research has not clarified how sustainable recovery
can be achieved in terms of players’ motives
(Joakim, 2013; Blaikie, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2006).
Research on recovery players’ motives and
interaction is still in the beginning stages. In terms of
short-term recovery, Coles and Zhuang (2011)
analyzed interactions between international and local
players for relief resource utilization using game
theory. Regarding long-term recovery, Keraminiyage

(2011) evaluated the applicability of game theory
concepts to housing reconstruction. However, the
concrete analysis methodology was not suggested.
This research aims to present analysis framework for
the long-term recovery process in terms of
stakeholders' motives and their conflicts in interactive
decision-making processes. For achieving expected
outcomes, important decisions in the recovery
process should be consistent with long-term goals.
However, some decisions are distorted by complex
motives or interaction among players. To guide such
shortsighted decisions into the desirable decision, it
is necessary to analyze related players’ motives and
their interactions. Based on the understanding of
causes, the conditions of compatible decisions with
desirable long-term goals will be suggested with a
motive-based approach.
2. METHODOLOGY
As the subject of analysis, decisions in long-term
recovery processes are selected on the basis of
negative influences on final recovery outcomes. In
regard to the main player of the decision and the
involved player, complex motives and related goals
are defined by a literature review. The priority order of
motives is determined based on contexts. For the
literature review, related research, reports by players,
news, and survey results were reviewed. The result
of research on the general tendencies in the motives
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of recovery players are also considered because
sometimes unspecified motives in players’ reports or
interviews can play an important role in decision
making.
To establish the direct cause of the decisions, the
interactive decision-making process among recovery
players is analyzed as a game of players pursuing
the best strategy. According to each player, the
preference for possible decisions can be evaluated
with priority order in motives. This this preference
information is applied to the analysis of interactive
decisions among players. Finally, the conditions for
shifting decisions from the actual decision to the
desirable and motive-compatible direction are
suggested.
3. HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA
AFTER THE 2004 TSUNAMI
As a case study, the recovery process of Sri Lanka
after the 2004 Tsunami was considered. On
December 26, 2004, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0
occurred off the Sumatran Coast, triggering a
tsunami of unprecedented proportions. In Sri Lanka,
the tsunami caused severe impacts including 35,322
people killed and 516,150 internally displaced people
(Government of Sri Lanka & Development Partners,
2005). Because 26% of the population lived within
one mile of the coast, damage in housing was severe
(World Bank, 2005). There were 99,480 homes
completely destroyed and 44,290 partially damaged,
together comprising some 13% of homes in the
affected districts (Lyons, 2009).
Largely as an outcome of the global media attention,
“one of the largest relief and rehabilitation operations
ever launched by humanitarian organizations around
the world” became implemented in Sri Lanka (Rawal
et al., 2005 as cited in Silva, 2009). The Sri Lankan
government adopted two types of reconstruction
programs for housing, the Donor Assisted Program
for relocating houses and the Owner Driven Program
for houses in situ. The Sri Lankan government was
able to begin relocating 30,602 houses by external
agencies
with
funds
(Reconstruction
and
Development Agency [RADA], 2006).
While participation of INGOs in housing bridged the
gap between required recovery resource and the
limited capacity of the Sri Lankan government, as a
result of long process, housing reconstruction by
INGOs did not achieve much success. Housing
construction by INGOs was much slower than the
Owner
Driven
Program
(RADA,
2006).
Nonoccupation of new houses by tsunami victims
reached 37% in Hambantota (Barenstein &
Wickramagamage, 2009).

3.1. Decisions Hindered Recovery Outcomes
In this research, only relocation projects implemented
by INGOs were considered because they reveal
interactive relations between players during the
recovery process. Based on the literature review, two
main decisions that resulted in slow progress and a
smaller number of constructed houses than expected
are defined.
The first decision was the government's failure of
relocation policy. The Sri Lankan government's failure
of having a relocation policy at the initial planning
phase of housing reconstruction resulted in negative
impacts on the overall recovery process even after
revision (Ingram, Franco, Rio, & Khazai, 2006). The
Sri Lankan government introduced a uniform
distance (100 m in the West and South and 200 m in
the North and East) buffer zone quickly (Silva, 2009).
The buffer zone policy incited massive relocation of
people and had negative impacts on recovery. For
instance, lack of consultation with people worsened
livelihood conditions in the relocation site and
resulted in a low occupancy rate after construction.
The other decision was the NGOs’ temporary or
permanent
withdrawal
during
reconstruction
implementation. This withdrawal resulted in a limited
outcome in housing reconstruction as well. There
were 65,000 pledges for donor driven made, but only
18% had been completed two years after the disaster
(Ratnasooriya, Samarawickrama, & Imamura, 2007)
Fulfillment of aid in housing below the initial plan
induced the inevitable revisions of plans and became
the reason of delayed housing recovery. Delay of the
reconstruction schedule also induced low occupancy
of new houses.
3.2. Involved Players in Decisions
As involved players with these two decisions, two
players are defined: the Sri Lankan government and
INGOs. In terms of the first decision, the
government’s initial relocation policy, INGOs that
have a key part in implementation of housing
relocation should be considered. It is about the same
for the second decision, because the INGOs’
decision to withdrawal is closely related to the
government’s policy revision. The government and
INGOs are in interdependent relations in housing
relocation projects.
4. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS: RELOCATION
PLAN
As the first step for analysis of the government’s
decision on relocation policy at the initial planning
phase, involved players’ motives and related goals
were defined by a literature review.
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4.1. Motives and Related Goals
4.1.1. Government of Sri Lanka
For the Sri Lankan government, the most direct
motive for relocation was matching electorates’
expectations. Political consideration influenced
composition of disaster management organizations
as well as relief resource distribution (Boano, 2009;
Silva, 2009). Hasty relocation planning can be
understood by the motive to show people the ability
to control a chaotic situation.
The second motive in the relocation plan was
vulnerability reduction. To cope with unregulated
development on the coast, the government tried to
introduce regulation policies since 1981 (Birkmann
et al., 2010), but implementation was not
successful. Repeated failure motivated the
government to address the chronic problem of
unplanned development (Mulligan & Shaw, 2007).
However, because of the lack of experience in
massive
relocation
or
reconstruction,
the
government focused on only risk exposure
reduction (Jayawardane, 2006).
Thirdly, effective resource utilization was another
motive in decisions because of limited recovery
budgets.
However,
relocation
policy
was
inconsistent with this motive because of expensive
budgets. When it is considered that the total loss
from the disaster was up to 4.5% of GDP, an
adaptation of the relocation plan shows that the
government put two other motives before resource
effectiveness (Lyons, 2009). Because the
government put a political factor before actual
damage distribution in relief resource distribution, it
can be considered that the government places a
high priority on matching electorates’ expectations.
The priority among motives of the government can
be defined, in order, as: matching electorates’
expectations, vulnerability reduction, and effective
resource utilization.
4.1.2. International NGOs
The Sri Lankan government’s relocation plan could
be implemented only with support of INGOs.
Therefore, for analysis of the government’s
relocation decision, INGOs’ decision to participate in
relocation should be analyzed as well.
Like the government, INGOs aim for vulnerability
reduction, but INGOs’ goals are focused on
supporting the most vulnerable people (International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies [IFRC], 2008). For instance, the
government’s initial housing policy, which gave one
house for one destroyed house without
consideration of the number of owned houses, did

correspond with the INGOs’ goals (Vaes &
Goddeeris, 2012). So additional assessment on
beneficiaries was applied by INGOs. Therefore, the
government’s relocation policy was not consistent
with INGOs’ goals.
INGOs also consider effective resource utilization
as a main motive. To maximize the impact of a
limited budget, for example, International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
tried to improve the design by feedback from
community meeting (IFRC, 2007). In comparison
with the motive to reduce vulnerability, INGOs put
vulnerability reduction above it. Such priority was
revealed at the soil tests of the Belgian Red Cross
because they were conducted only to show the
capability and willingness to undertake relocation
work for the government despite a waste of budget.
On this criterion in effectiveness, uniform distance
relocation was not preferred for a minimum
relocation plan.
In spite of these contrary motives, INGOs undertook
construction in relocation to meet another motive,
matching donors’ expectations. For INGOs,
disasters have become an important opportunity for
fundraising, and participation in disaster work is
crucial to profiles (Lyons, 2009). Therefore, INGOs
felt pressure to show their capabilities of doing
projects (IFRC, 2007).
The priority among motives of INGOs can be
defined, in order as: matching donors’ expectations,
vulnerability reduction, and effective resource
utilization.
4.2. Analysis of Interactive Decisions
4.2.1. Evaluation of Possible Decisions
INGOs joined the government’s relocation plan with
the uniform distance buffer zone. However, it was
an incompatible decision with INGOs’ vulnerability
reduction motive. To meet that motive, it can be
considered as a possible option that INGOs asked
the government to develop detailed criteria for
relocation even if it takes time. Four possible
decision sets can be considered like below.
Decision set: (Sri Lankan Government, INGO)
1. (Uniform distance relocation plan, Join in )
2. (Uniform distance relocation plan, Not join)
3. (Minimum distance relocation plan, Join in )
4. (Minimum distance relocation plan, Not join)
According to the Sri Lankan government’s motives,
each decision set can be evaluated. First of all, in
terms of matching electorates’ expectations, two
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4.2.3. Conditions to Shift Decisions

Figure 1. Extensive form game in decisions on relocation plan

goals can be defined as “quick response for
showing situation control” and “capability to proceed
recovery continuously based on ‘quick response,’”
preference are decided as (a)=(b)>(c)=(d).
According to “capability to proceed recovery,”
preference can be defined as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d).
Secondly,
regarding
vulnerability
reduction
especially in the risk exposure reduction goal, the
order of decisions is decided as (a)=(b)>(c)=(d).
Thirdly, for effective resource utilization, preference
is decided as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d). After considering all
the factors, the government’s preference order of
decision sets is decided as (a)>(c)>(b)>(d).
INGOs’ preference can be decided as same
manner. For matching donors’ expectations focusing
on undertake recovery work, preference is decided
as (a)=(c)>(b)=(d). Secondly, according to effective
resource utilization focusing budget investment,
preference
is
(c)>(b)=(d)>(a).
Finally,
for
vulnerability reduction focusing on helping the most
vulnerable people, the order is decided as
(c)>(a)>(d)=(b). Taken together, INGOs’ preference
is in order of (c)>(a)>(b)=(d).
4.2.2. Analysis of Strategies
The government and INGOs sequentially made
decisions for housing reconstruction at relocation
sites. This relationship can be represented by
extensive form game between two players like
Figure 1. In this figure, preference was represented
as amount of payoff. Payoff number shows only
order among options.
For INGOs, the decision to join the relocation
became the dominant strategy that gives higher
payoff than not to join, regardless of the
government’s decision. The government can
maximize payoff by selecting the uniform distance
relocation plan. However, each player’s reasonable
decision (a) resulted in negative impact on longterm recovery by introducing an inappropriate policy
without enough consultation with people in a hurry.
In the viewpoint of long-term vulnerability reduction,
the decision set (c) is the most desirable case.

First of all, for shifting actual decisions to the
desirable one, much research suggested normative
solutions to change motive or related goals directly
related to decisions (Ingram et al., 2006; Coles &
Zhuang, 2011). Regarding the Sri Lankan
government’s decision on relocation, policymaker’s
recognition that forced relocation should be
minimized by consultation with people, which can
be one of the normative solutions. Such recognition
can change only the motive of vulnerability reduction
and is not enough to change the decision because
the strongest motive to match electorates’
expectations will not be changed.
On the other hand, in terms of interaction among
players, the desirable decision set is same with the
decision of maximum payoff for INGOs. If INGOs
tried to increase their own payoff by threating the
government to select a minimum distance relocation
policy, INGOs could change the government’s
decision because of budget dependence on INGOs.
The reason why threats could not be made was
because of competition among INGOs for
undertaking recovery work. According to UN-Habitat
(2011), among the 500 new agencies that arrived in
Sri Lanka, about 100 agencies had developed
housing components into their programs and induced
exceptional competition for participation. In the
context of strong motives for fundraising, exclusion of
other INGOs in recovery work gives the position of
advantage. So it hampered voluntary coordination
among INGOs. Eventually, INGOs lost the chance to
enhance payoff by issuing a credible threat to the
government.
According to game theory, credibility in threats can
be introduced by a change of players (Shin, 2002).
For instance, cooperative systems among INGOs in
the housing field could be the solution to introduce
credibility by changing the players in negotiation with
the government. As a unified player, they could
pursue maximizing the payoff for INGOs. Moreover
they can contribute to enhancing effectiveness for
advising
an
inexperienced
government
on
policymaking immediately after disaster.
5. ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS: WITHDRAWAL OF
PROJECTS
INGOs’ temporary or permanent withdrawal is
another decision that hampered long-term outcomes
in housing. It gradually occurred between the
introduction of the buffer zone in January 2005 and
the announcement of a new housing policy in May
2006. Before the analysis of motives on this decision,
context changes induced by previous decisions
should be considered above all because they
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changed internal motives as well as external
contexts.
5.1. Motives and Related Goals
5.1.1. Change in Context
Regarding changes in external context, first of all,
lack of feasibility in the initial relocation plan was
revealed. Assessment of coastal hazards and
tsunami impacts revealed inappropriateness in the
initial relocation criteria (Samaranayake, 2007). A
lack of suitable land for relocation became the direct
cause for policy revision (IFRC, 2006). Moreover,
another earthquake of magnitude 8.6 in March 2005,
which was not accompanied by tsunami, raised a
question on objectives of a buffer zone (Hyndman,
2009).
Secondly, resumed civil war in December 2005
hampered progress of recovery projects. Distorted
relief resource distribution by political consideration
worsened the socioeconomic disparities and led to
ethnic conflict, which caused delay of recovery in the
North and East areas (Ingram et al. 2006).
Thirdly, a new president was elected in November
2005 based on worsen disparities during recovery.
The new president quickly distanced himself from the
previous presidency by changing his predecessor’s
government tsunami response body. Then, he
announced in February 2006 that the buffer zone
would be relaxed and the setback standards of the
Costal Zone Management Plan of 1997 would be
revived. (The Sunday Times, 2006, as cited in
Hyndman, 2009)
5.1.2. Government of Sri Lanka
While the Sri Lankan government was not a decisionmaker of the project withdrawal, its revision of the
relocation policy the INGOs’ decision. The relocation
policy revision can be considered by complex
motives.
The most significant change in motive, vulnerability
reduction, was that the government started to take
various aspects of vulnerability into account based on
scientific assessment and revealed limitations in
relocation. Assessment of socioeconomic impacts by
relocation served as momentum to reconsider the
guidelines for development in the coastal zone
(Samaranayake, 2007).
Secondly, the motive, matching electorates’
expectations led to policy change based on
accumulated limitations of the previous plan. The
new regime had strong motive to solve the
accumulated problems in recovery. The Revised
Tsunami Housing Policy that expanded housing
support from 98,525 to 120,000 in May 2006 can be

understood as the intention to match electorates’
expectations (RADA, 2006). The government put this
motive above vulnerability reduction because, after
the revision of relocation criteria, the government
gave people the chance to decide whether to
relocate or not.
On the other hand, change of relocation criteria was
not consistent with the motive for effective resource
utilization because it can interrupt ongoing projects
with funds. At that time, the government suffered
from budget constraints even to provide infrastructure
at relocation sites (Belgian Red Cross (CRB), 2009).
Nevertheless, the relocation policy was revised. It
shows that the government put the other two motives
before effective resource utilization.
The priority among motives of the government can
be defined, in order, as: matching electorates’
expectations, vulnerability reduction, and effective
resource utilization.
5.1.3. International NGOs
Regarding
the
motive,
matching
donors’
expectations, after confirming the participation in
reconstruction, the goal was changed from
participation itself to making the project’s outcomes.
For instance, Red Cross partners were under
increasing pressure from donors and the media to
demonstrate their use of resources (IFRC, 2007).
When it is considered to make visible outcomes in
housing, the reconstruction project should be kept.
On the other hand, the motive that became the direct
reason for project withdrawal was effective resource
utilization. Because the characteristics of housing
reconstruction required a long investment, it was
hard to collect investment once the project was
stopped, meaning that stopping the investment could
have been the best strategy for INGOs when there
was the possibility of project cancellation by the
government. It also corresponds with the survey
result on INGOs that NGOs focus primarily on shortterm accountability (Ebrahim, 2003).
Another motive related to project withdrawal was
vulnerability reduction. The resumed conflict had shift
the attention of INGOs from tsunami recovery to the
emerging internally displaced people crisis (IFRC,
2008). The 2005 Kashmir earthquake encouraged
some INGOs to divert attention to the new flashpoint
before they had completed their mission in Sri Lanka.
Of the total pledge of US $3.1 billion, only US $1.7
billion had been actually committed by 2007 (Silva,
2009). Therefore, INGOs’ project withdrawal was the
result of both motives to prevent waste of budget and
to support new vulnerable people. Within these
motives, vulnerability reduction can be considered as
a high priority based on that additional criterion was
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applied to find more vulnerable people during
implementation.
All things taken together, the priority among motives
of INGOs can be defined, in order, as: vulnerability
reduction, effective resource utilization, and matching
donors expectations.
5.2. Analysis of Interactive Decisions
5.2.1. Evaluation of Possible Decisions
The relationship between the government and
INGOs can be represented by an extensive form
game between two players. Five possible decision
sets can be considered, like below.
Decisions set: (INGO, Sri Lankan Government,
INGO)
1. (Progress project, Keep project,—)
2. (Progress project, Stop project,—)
3. (Hold on project, Keep project, Resume)
4. (Hold on project, Keep project, Stop)
5. (Hold on project, Stop project,—)
Each decision set can be evaluated according to
motives of the government. First of all, in terms of
matching electorates’ expectations, two goals can be
defined as “quick progress of recovery” and
“capability to proceed recovery continuously.” Based
on “quick progress,” preferences are decided as
(a)>(c)>(b)>(e)>(d). According to “capability to
proceed recovery,” preferences can be defined as
(a)>(c)=(e)>(b)>(d). Secondly, regarding vulnerability
reduction focusing on “reduce socioeconomic impact
by unnecessary relocation,” the order of decision is
(a)=(c)>(e)>(d)>(b). Thirdly, for “effective resource
utilization” focusing on keeping the recovery budget
by aid, preference is decided as (a)=(c)>(b)=(e)>(d).
Therefore, the government’s preference order of
decision sets is decided as (a)>(c)>(e)>(b)>(d).
INGOs’ preferences can be determined as well. For
vulnerability reduction focusing on helping the most
vulnerable people, the order is decided as
(c)>(d)=(e)>(a)>(b). Secondly, according to effective
resource utilization focusing on budget investment,
preference is (c)>(a)>(d)=(e)>(b). Finally, for
matching donors’ expectations focusing on
undertaking recovery work, preference is decided as
(a)>(c)>(e)>(d)>(b). When put together, INGOs’
preference is in order of (c)>(d)>(a)>(e)>(b).
5.2.2. Analysis of Strategies
Government and INGOs sequentially made decisions
on the progress of housing reconstruction project at
the relocation site. This relationship can be

Figure 2. Extensive form game in decisions on withdrawal of
projects

represented by extensive form game between two
players, like Figure 2.
In the viewpoint of INGOs, the decision to keep the
project on was the dominant strategy that gives higher
payoff regardless of the government’s decisions.
Even though it induces delay of the recovery process,
temporary withdrawal of INGOs was a reasonable
decision to maximize their own payoff.
For INGOs, it is important to keep the motive for
continuous investment during long-term recovery.
However, in housing reconstruction, uncertainty in
changing relocation criteria lowered the expected
payoff from further investment. Moreover, in terms
of INGOs’ goal to support the most vulnerable
people, the government’s beneficiaries selection
was inconsistent with INGOs’ criteria. On the other
hand, another chance to help vulnerable people in
the resumed civil war or another international
disaster became the reason why many INGOs
decided to divert the housing projects’ budgets to
other works.
5.2.3. Conditions to Shift Decisions
The key issue for sustainability of long-term
recovery processes can be how to motivate INGOs
to maintain their investment for recovery.
First of all, as a normative solution for INGOs’
withdrawal during implementation of long-term
recovery project, commitment of INGOs for local
development is considered. However, for long-term
recovery, like housing and infrastructure, INGOs’
motive to keep their investment was influenced by
the government’s recovery policy that could define
INGOs’ expected payoff. Without a proper policy
that could meet the motive of INGOs to support
vulnerable people, INGOs would consider diverting
the budget to other fields or disaster cases to
maximize their motive.
Measures to enhance INGOs’ payoff by keeping
their investment in long-term projects had to be
considered as a motive-compatible solution. One of
the factors influencing expected payoff was
uncertainty in policy revision. The government did
not share information on how much the buffer zone
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would be reduced with people and INGOs, and such
uncertainty decreased INGOs’ payoff from
persisting in the housing project. It became a
fundamental reason for withdrawal of INGOs from
the housing projects. As a measure to reduce
uncertainty in long-term recovery, the government
could consider allowing INGOs to participate in
policymaking processes or share information with
INGOs.
INGOs’
participation
in
recovery
policymaking can reduce the uncertainty of policy
revision and increase the expected payoff in longterm investment by reflecting their own criteria in
planning.
6. CONCLUSION
The long-term recovery process was analyzed by
various stakeholders’ motives and their conflicts in
an interactive decision-making process. The
conditions for improvement of long-term recovery
output were suggested in terms of motive
compatibility. As a case study, the recovery process
of Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami was analyzed.
Two key decisions for limited achievement of longterm recovery goals were defined.
Firstly, the Sri Lankan government’s hasty
introduction of uniform distance relocation was the
result of complex conditions and motives including
their own political conflict, lack of relocation
experience, and INGOs’ competition for recovery
participation. A normative solution for changing the
direct motive for decision, like supplementation of
experience, can be an impractical solution because
of the low frequency of large-scale disasters. When
the interactive decision among players is
considered, improving the government’s initial
recovery policy can be achieved by issuing a
credible threat from INGOs. In Sri Lanka, the reason
why INGOs could not make a credible threat was
competition among INGOs over the capacity of
coordination. A coordination system among INGOs
in the housing field can be the solution to introduce
credibility.
Secondly, INGOs’ projects withdrawal was defined
as decision induced by the delay of the whole
recovery process in Sri Lanka. Such a decision was
made based on motives and conditions, including
accumulated limitation of uniform relocation plan,
political regime change, and emergence of new
vulnerable people. As a direct measure for motives
of withdrawal, increasing commitment of INGOs for
local society can be considered. But when it comes
into conflict with other motives, like pursuing budget
effectiveness and supporting vulnerable people, it
cannot change the actual decision. As a motivecompatible solution, the Sri Lankan government can
prevent INGOs’ from withdrawal during recovery by

increasing INGOs’ expected payoff in long-term
participation. It can be possible by involving INGOs
in recovery policy-making.
In terms of the recovery process, it was revealed
that the failure in the initial phase had a lasting
effect on players’ motives. For instance, the
government’s exclusion of INGOs in the initial
planning demotivated continuous participation in
long-term recovery. It led to the decline in
outcomes. Although the government had gradually
widened their understanding of vulnerability and
expanded consultation with INGOs in decision
making, INGOs withdrawal was not prevented
successfully. It shows the importance of the early
planning phase for achieving a sustainable, longterm recovery process.
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